It is also happening at a time when many of those leaders are exhibiting populist and authoritarian tendencies, dismantling checks and balances and seeking to involve military commanders in their political projects. This is happening at a time when many of the region’s elected civilian leaders have been assigning non-military roles to their armed forces, and ceding political influence to generals, to an extent not seen since transitions to democracy began in the 1980s and 1990s. Security planners in Washington voice a greater desire to engage with, and assist, the region’s armed forces in order to deny access to China, and to a lesser extent to Russia, Iran, and other competitors. However, the fifth phase-great-power competition-threatens to reverse this trend. And starting during the Obama administration, security planners started to take more into account the potential harm to civil-military relations that encouragement of internal military roles might cause. Southern Command, during the 2010s as Latin America became a lower-priority region for the Defense Department. Military assistance declined, as did the budget of U.S. New human rights protections, like the Leahy Law limiting aid to abusive units, curbed some important excesses. The “war on terror” turned out to be a poor fit for a region with almost no terrorist groups with global reach. Military aid to interdict drugs or fight organized crime concentrated on a few countries, and on a few vetted military units, while aid declined elsewhere. assistance for internal military missions declined steadily, if unevenly. (Withers et al., 2010) These resources and messages frequently helped tip the civil-military balance toward those in uniform, at times when civilian leaders were endeavoring to assert control during transitions to democracy.ĭuring the second through fourth phases, though (war on drugs, war on terror, focus on TCOs), U.S. assistance often encouraged armed forces to carry out internal missions, like policing, surveillance, crowd control, or development projects. These are the Cold War fight against communism (until about 1990) the “war on drugs” (the late 1980s to early 2000s) the “war on terror” (the 2000s) a broader focus on “transnational criminal organizations” (TCOs, the 2010s) and today, a return to great-power competition, particularly with China. military assistance programs have been guided by five overarching missions. The United States is by far the largest international donor, equipper, and trainer to Latin America’s armed forces. Avoiding this outcome will require the United States to do more to protect and support the region’s increasingly vibrant, but often misunderstood, civil society. This may happen even if recipient governments are authoritarian-trending and use their militaries internally to confront “hybrid threats” within the population. military support for governments that work with the United States and deny access to China and others. pullback from encouraging militarization may be reversing in the 2020s, though, as Washington’s defense strategy shifts to great-power competition. “wars” on drugs, terror, and organized crime brought reduced, more focused aid and some reluctance to expand military roles. This kind of aid declined, however, during the post-cold war period, as the U.S. military assistance has long encouraged armed forces to take on internal roles, complicating civil-military relations. 28: “ Estados Unidos y su influencia en el nuevo militarismo latinoamericano” ( ). This commentary was published in Spanish by the Fundación Carolina on Novemas Análisis Carolina no.
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